Will as Intertemporal Bargaining: Implications for Rationality by Ainslie, George & Monterosso, John
WILL AS INTERTEMPORAL BARGAINING: IMPLICATIONS
FOR RATIONALITY
GEORGE AINSLIEt &JOHN MONTEROSSOtt
Rationality has been understood as conducting yourself according to reason
rather than passion. In modern times this endeavor has become synonymous with
maximizing your expected goods, with the value of expected but delayed goods dis-
counted exponentially. However, behavioral research has found a robust tendency
for delayed goods to be discounted hyperbolically, that is, for their value to be di-
vided by their delay. This finding supplies a simple hypothesis about the origin of
irrationality, but greatly complicates the problem of rationality, since it depicts a
limited warfare relationship among interests within an individual. Recent re-
search on the combining properties of hyperbolically discounted rewards supports
the hypothesis that a person s will arises from a prisoner's-dilemma-like relationship
among successive motivational states. This picoeconomic hypothesis provides a
mechanism for both the strength and 'freedom" of the will, and predicts pathologies
of overcontrol that make strength of will something very different from pure ration-
ality. This approach offers insights into current puzzles about criminal responsi-
bility and the disease model of addiction.
INTRODUCTION
Rationality is an ancient concept, one that Plato contrasted with
passion to form a dichotomy of choice principles.' Through the ages
rationality has meant the good way to make choices, the way that will
maximize your satisfaction with the outcome. As such, it has been a
norm rather than a description of actual behavior. However, since
utility theory has postulated that people always maximize their ex-
pected utility, rationality has acquired a descriptive implication: the
rational is what anyone inevitably will do whenever she is aware of
the true contingencies she faces. Irrationality then is merely error,
the product of some fallacious valuation process. Modern rational
choice theory (RCT) thus aims not only at normative optimality but
also at factual accuracy; it consists of "a series of assumptions about
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how people respond to incentives. 2 Yet it inevitably retains a norma-
tive implication as well, the implied contrast with the phenomenon
of irrationality.
As a descriptive theory, RCT has come under attack from two
disparate directions. People wary of reductionist science complain
that it under-recognizes empathic transactions; they claim that it de-
picts as natural-and thus promulgates-a selfish, money-grubbing
society.3 At the same time, empirical researchers find that it fails to
predict important examples of behavior exhibited by well-informed
subjects in experiments within behavioral science.4 Furthermore, the
examples documented by systematic analysis are only a small propor-
tion of the behavior patterns that people say they do not want but
seem unable to give up. Seemingly free choice has led not only to
alcoholism and drug abuse in a significant minority of people, but
also to an epidemic of overeating, credit card abuse, overconsump-
tion of passive entertainment, and other bad habits too widespread
to be diagnosed as pathological.
RCT arose not so much from empirical research as from a theo-
retical analysis of what decision strategies will dominate in market-
2 Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000). For
further elaboration on rational choice theory, see Robert Sugden, Rational Choice: A
Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy, 101 ECON.J. 751 (1991)
See, e.g., JOHN DUPR , HUMAN NATURE AND THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE 148 (2001)
("Not infrequently positive economics assumes that the real question is about maximiz-
ing wealth measured in monetary terms .... An obviously preferable goal would be
something like standard of living .... ); BARRY SCHwARTZ, THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN
NATURE: SCIENCE, MORALITY AND MODERN LIFE 247-48 (1986) (arguing that the disci-
plines of economics, sociobiology, and behavior theory "have contributed to, and
helped justify, the conditions that foster the pursuit of economic self-interest to the
exclusion of almost all else").
4 For an example in political science, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RAIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994). For a source regarding econom-
ics, see RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); and for psychology,
see Leonard Green et al., Discounting of Delayed Rewards: A Life-Span Comparison, 5
PSYCHiOL. SCI. 33 (1994); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic,
inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982); George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65
ORGANIZATIONAl. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272 (1996).
5 See generally LAWRENCEJ. HATTERER, THE PLEASURE ADDICTS (1980) (describing
the process of addiction); ROBERT KUBEY & MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, TELEVISION
AND THF QUALITY OF LIFE: HOW VIEWING SHAPES EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE (1990) (exam-
ining television addiction); Avner Offer, Epidemics of Abundance: Overeating and
Slimming in the USA and Britain Since the 1950s (Nov. 1998) (unpublished manu-
script) (discussing the "social epidemics of overeating and slimming"), available at
http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/history/paper25/25offera4.pdf.
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places.6 To prevail over any significant period of time, an intention
must be stable, and stability requires the standard properties of ra-
tionality-particularly commensurability, transitivity, and invariance
across contexts. 7 However, this approach makes rational choice the-
ory a set of rules for winning play-a normative model-rather than
a description of how choice actually works. Even in the far simpler
world of game theory, human subjects in experiments notoriously
fail to follow obvious strategies that would increase their success."
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman and his collaborators have di-
rectly studied human utility maximization. They estimated "objective
happiness" by taking subjects' numeric self-reports of happiness
moment by moment and calculating the area under the resulting
curve over time. According to the researchers, "[l]ogical analysis
suggests" that the utility that a person derives from a particular event
should be equal to the integral of all the instants that make up that
event.' o The integral that the researchers derived from this experi-
ment did not reflect the way that the same subjects chose between
the very experiences that they had evaluated this way. Subjects did
not prefer those experiences with the greatest summed happiness
(or least summed unhappiness), but displayed various perceptual
distortions, particularly overvaluation of the greatest momentary
reading and the latest reading." These experiments demonstrate
that real world utilities, as evaluated by RCT, fail tests for transitivity
and invariance and, therefore, that conventional RCT is flawed as a
descriptive theory.
In this Article, we present a utility-based model that fixes the ma-
jor problems of RCT. We argue that decisions are determined in a
single intrapersonal marketplace on the basis of a unitary selective
principle-reward (Part I)-but the basic shape of the discount
6 The pioneer was Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REv.
ECON. STUD. 155, 155 (1937) (presenting a theoretical method for measuring the
marginal utility of income).
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1064 (stating that commensurability, tran-
sitivity, and invariance are some of the necessary conditions of rational behavior).
E.g., Richard H. Thaler, The Ultimatum Game, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1988, at 195,
196-98.
9 Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 3, 5 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
10 Id. at 3.
i Charles A. Schreiber & Daniel Kahneman, Determinants of the Remembered Utility of
Aversive Sounds, 129J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCIOL.: GEN. 27, 27-28 (2000) (discussing the
results of experiments testing the peak-end rule).
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curve for this reward creates conflicting interests within the individ-
ual (Part II). These conflicts can be partially resolved by perception
of a prisoner's-dilemma-like relationship among successive motiva-
tional states, which generates will (Part III), but which does not ap-
proach rationality closely (Part IV). This model has practical impli-
cations for law and economics, the direction of which we can only
suggest (Part V).
1. ALL REWARD MUST BE COMMENSURABLE
While RCT is unable to account for certain behavioral phenom-
ena, in rejecting it there is a risk of throwing out the baby with the
bath water. It is true that people do not behave so as to maximize at-
tainment of a stable and ordered set of goals. Indeed, we will argue
that they do not maximize any quantum without regard to the time
at which they make their choice. Such a finding, however, does not
require the conclusion-often encountered in cognitive psychol-
ogy-that choice is irreducibly particularistic and not constrained to
maximize anything. We do not have to abandon RCT's assumption
that motivated behavior occurs within a single internal market, with a
single currency of transaction. Indeed, research in both neuro-
physiology and behavioral psychology points to just such a market.
Over the last half-century neurophysiologists have located, with
increasing precision, brain sites that control the selection of behav-
iors. From early on, it was known that animals would work to receive
electrical stimulation in the medial forebrain bundle and nucleus ac-
12
cumbens. Rats that can press a lever to get stimulation in these ar-
eas have been observed to press continuously for hours, until they
become too weak to go on.'" The same portions of their brains,
which form part of the mesolimbic (midbrain) reward circuitry, were
later shown to be those excited by cocaine 4 and by all other reward-
ing drugs that have been studied.'5 Furthermore, advances in brain-
12 SeeJames Olds, "Reward" from Brain Stimulation in the Rat, 122 SCIENCE 878, 878
(1955) (noting that rats with electrodes implanted into certain areas of their brains
would seek to stimulate themselves by activating the electrodes); James Olds & Peter
Milner, Positive Reinforcement Produced by Electrical Stimulation of Septal Area and Other Re-
gions of Rat Brain, 471J. COMP. & PISIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 419, 426 (1954) (same).
:11 Olds, supra note 12, at 878.
14 See Hans C. Breiter et al., Acute Effects of Cocaine on Human Brain Activity and Emo-
tion, 19 NEURON 591, 591 (1997) (summarizing that cocaine causes signal increases in
the nucleus accumbens and other areas).
15 See Gaetano Di Chiara & Assunita Imperato, Drugs Abused by Humans Preferentially
Increase Synaptic Dopamine Concentrations in the Mesolimbic System of Freely Moving Rats, 85
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imaging technology have made it possible to observe the reward pro-
cess in normal human volunteers. These studies have shown that ac-
tivity in mesolimbic reward circuitry accompanies even minor re-
wards such as winning a dollar,16 receiving a squirt of pleasant tasting
juice," or viewing an attractive face.'8 Thus, there is an observable
physical process that responds proportionately to known rewards.
It may turn out that localization of reward is more complex than
current data suggest. However, commensurability of incentives is, in
the end, a logical requirement of any theory of voluntary behavior;
otherwise there would exist choices that could not be made.'9  As
neurophysiologists Peter Shizgal and Kent Conover point out, the ul-
timate basis of choice must include a comprehensive marketplace of
incentives. 0 They state that " [f] or orderly choice to be possible, the
utility of all competing resources must be represented on a single,
common dimension .,,2' A model in which the activity of a quantita-
tive selective mechanism determines value and hence choice need
not require the maximization of total utility, but prevailing choices
must be doing something over time that induces more of this selec-
tive process (hereinafter reward) than their rejected alternatives did.
The data from neurophysiology only add anatomic specificity to
the vast literature on behavioral psychology, which has shown that
22choice is exquisitely sensitive to small changes in incentive. Unlike
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCl. U.S. 5274, 5274 (1988) (providing evidence that all drugs
abused by humans stimulate dopamine transmission in the limbic system).
16 See Brian Knutson et al., Anticipation of Increasing Monetary Reward Selectively Re-
cruits Nucleus Accumbens, 21 J. NEUROSCI. RC159, at 2-3 (2001), at
http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/reprint/21/16/RC159.pdf (indicating that +$1.00 and
+$5.00 cues elicited happiness in human participants).
17 See Gregory S. Berns et al., Predictability Modulates Human Brain Response to Re-
ward, 21 J. NEUROSCI. 2793, 2797 (2001) (usingjuice and water to study human reward
regions).
18 See Knut K.W. Kampe et al., Reward Value of Attractiveness and Gaze, 413 NATURE
589, 589 (2001) (showing that brain activity increases when viewing an attractive face,
especially when the face is directed toward the viewer).
19 See, e.g., GEORGE AINSLIE, PICOECONOMICS: THE STRATEGIC INTERACTION OF
SUCCESSIVE MOTIVATIONAL STATES WITHIN THE PERSON 28-32 (1992) (demonstrating
that a person's multiple centers of choice must compete on the same decisional di-
mension).
20 Peter Shizgal & Kent Conover, On the Neural Computation of Utility, 5 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 37, 37-38 (1996).
21 Id.
22 See Richard J. Herrnstein, Method and Theory in the Study of Avoidance, 76
PSYCHOL. REV. 49, 67 (1969) (reporting how choice responds to incentives). See gener-
ally RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, THE MATCHING LAW: PAPERS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS (Howard Rachlin & David I. Laibson eds., 1997) (presenting Herrnstein's
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neurophysiology, behavioral psychology has extensively studied the
effect of delay on the incentive value of reward. This study of delay
has suggested a way to reconcile subjects' failure to maximize ex-
pected reward with the strict determination of choice by reward.
II. THE VALUE OF REWARD IS INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO DELAY
It has long been known that people discount the value of delayed
goods, although some writers from Plato23 to the Victorian economist
Jevons2" have called such discounting irrational. However, no one
now thinks that rationality means maximization of reward without
regard to timing-that $1001 a year from now is worth more than
$1000 now. Thus, the concept of reward maximization has had to
include some kind of discounting from the moment of expected de-
livery back to the moment of decision. Financial markets long ago
established a norm for how this discounting should take place-the
loss of a constant proportion of remaining value per unit of time, or
exponential curve, which is the only function that will not lead to
changes of relative valuation among goods at different delays as time
passes. People adopted this curve to such an extent that, as utility
theory took mathematical shape, this curve was assumed to depict
not only the normatively rational discount rate but also the one that
people follow spontaneously.
However, precise preference experiments in the last third of the
twentieth century found a natural curve with roughly the same ap-
pearance-bowed upward to show smaller decrements as delays get
longer-but with significantly different properties. This is the hy-
perbolic curve, which makes value inversely proportional to delay. A
variant of behavioral psychologist Richard Herrnstein's matching law
theory of choice). Parametric motivational studies of children have shown both a con-
tinuity with the animal literature and the apparent effects of cultural overlay, which
reduces the efficiency of some children in getting reward. See Edmund J.S. Sonuga-
Barke et al., Children's Choice: Sensitivity to Changes in Reinforcer Density, 51 J.
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 185, 196 (1989) (suggesting that internalized norms
sometimes make children unresponsive to schedules of reward).
23 See PLAro, PROTAGORAS 61-64 (Gregory Vlastos ed., Martin Ostwald trans.,
1956) (discussing the choice between pleasures and pains).
24 See W. STANLEYJEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 70-74 (London,
MacMillan 2d ed. 1879) (explaining the role of time on measurements of pleasurable
effect).
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25as applied to delay, this curve is adequately described by James Ma-
zur's simple formula:2
Value = Value at No Delay
1 + (Constant x Delay)
The constant describes the subject's degree of impatience in the
situation under study. By varying this one element, investigators
have been able to produce substantially better fits to choices among
delayed rewards than were possible with the exponential curves as-
27sumed by most utility theories.
This curve gives preference a property that most people would
call irrational-an innate tendency to switch from better-later goods
to poorer-earlier goods simply as the earlier goods become immi-
nently available (Figure 1). Such an innate instability of choice
would seem maladaptive and hence unlikely to survive in evolution.
However, people demonstrate it regularly when making single-shot
choices in many different modalities of reward, including not only
physical rewards like food2" and relief from noxious noise, 29 but also
money.30 The only situations in which people do not seem to show
hyperbolic discounting involve financial planning, where classical
economics often makes successful predictions. Furthermore, the
25 See Shin-Ho Chung & RJ. Herrnstein, Choice and Delay of Reinforcement, 10 J.
EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAv. 67, 67 (1967) (validating the matching law for de-
layed reinforcement).
26James E. Mazur, An Adjusting Procedure for Studying Delayed Reinforcement, in 5
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES OF BEHAVIOR 55, 58-59 (Michael L. Commons et al. eds.,
1987).
27 See id. at 71-72 (arguing that Mazur's formula provides a better explanation of
test results than exponential curves).
28 See Steven P. Ragotzy et al., Self-Control in Mentally Retarded Adolescents: Choice as a
Function of Amount and Delay of Reinforcement, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 191,
195 (1988) (finding that mentally retarded adolescents changed preference from a
smaller-earlier to a larger-later food reward as the delay before the earlier reward was
increased).
29 SeeJay V. Solnick et al., An Experimental Analysis of Impulsivity and Impulse Control
in Humans, 11 LEARNING & MOTIVATION 61, 74 (1980) (finding that a majority of par-
ticipants in a study shifted preference from earlier, shorter terminations of irritating
noise to delayed but longer terminations as the delay to the early terminations was in-
creased).
30 See Kris N. Kirby & R.J. Herrnstein, Preference Reversals Due to Myopic Discounting of
Delayed Reward, 6 PSYCHOL. Sci. 83, 85-87 (1995) (noting that greater than ninety per-
cent of participants in a study shifted preference from a smaller-earlier cash award to a
larger-later one as delays to both awards increased); see also GEORGE AINSLIE,
BREAKDOWN OF WILL 33-34 (2001) (arguing that most people would prefer $100 im-
mediately to $200 in three years, but not $100 in six years to $200 in nine years).
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universal observation of this pattern in animal experiments shows
that this tendency is not an artifact of human culture, but an elemen-
tary property of a subject's response to reward.'
Figure 1
>
Time -
Hyperbolic discount curves from two rewards of different sizes available at differ-
ent times (vertical hatched lines). The smaller-earlier reward is temporarily valued
higher (preferred) for a period just before it is available, as shown by the portion of
its curve that projects above that of the larger-later reward.
The finding of hyperbolic discounting at the root of reward valua-
tion requires a radical reconceptualization of rationality and RCT.
Accepting that reward is the selective factor for choice, and that peo-
ple (and all behaving organisms) are constrained to maximize pro-
spective discounted reward, makes the definition of rational choice
both elementary and tricky. Rationality is clearly not maximization of
actual reward at a single moment in time, which could best be accom-
plished by choosing tremendous short-term pleasure regardless of
long-term consequences-perhaps smoking crack cocaine. The an-
swer might be maximization of all discounted expected rewards-ex-
cept that this criterion alone still includes, by definition, all behaviors
that people actually choose, including smoking crack cocaine. Hy-
perbolic discounting implies that maximizing expected reward will
sometimes entail not only preferring an objectively lesser good over a
greater one but also changing to this preference over time. Maximiza-
tion of reward will seemingly dictate opposite choices when a smaller-
21 See AINSLIE, supra note 19, at 63-76 (documenting animal and human experi-
ments that demonstrate hyperbolic discounting).
32 An objectively lesser good can be defined operationally as an alternative that is
valued less when both options are available with no delay.
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earlier good and a larger-later good are both distant and when the
smaller-earlier good is imminent.
Thus, maximization per se can no longer be sufficient to define
what would intuitively be called rational, since a person continually
maximizing prospective reward would demonstrate radically unstable
preferences that she herself, in the long view, would find unsatisfac-
tory. Likewise, hyperbolic discounting offers a concept of irrationality
that does not depend on a miscalculation of the contingencies of re-
ward. Irrationality may simply be the person's choice of an alternative
that she prefers only temporarily because of its proximity, rather than
because she has misperceived its magnitude. By the same logic, two
normative definitions of rationality may exist: rationality may be con-
sistency, i.e., not undergoing temporary changes of preference, or ra-
tionality may be maximizing the longest-range goods, those that she
would choose from the perspective of the greatest distance. These
two possibilities are similar, but not identical, as we shall see. Either
one permits a person to be irrational while still maximizing her dis-
counted expected utility at every moment." And in either case, this
analysis separates the descriptive theory from the normative.
III. INVERSE PROPORTIONALITY PREDICTS A MECHANISM FOR WILL
We must leave the normative definition of rationality for a while
and examine a more important question for RCT as a descriptive the-
ory: What is reason and how does it contrast with passion? That is,
what is the nature of the faculty that might make our choices consis-
tent and/or maximize our longest-range good? It can no longer be
just knowledge of the true contingencies of reward; a person can
know through firsthand experience that drinking is not in her long-
range interest and accordingly plan not to drink, but go on a binge
when the opportunity arises. Some centuries after Plato, philosophy
33 Neither definition requires rationality to call for selfishness, as anti-reductionists
have feared. However, a discussion of this point must involve the consequences of hy-
perbolic discounting for emotion and empathy, which we cannot begin here. See
AINSLIE, supra note 30, at 161-89 (discussing how hyperbolic discounting leads people
to satiate appetites prematurely, including those for emotions; and in response, we
look to vicarious experience and risk as "good source[s] of occasions for emotional
reward"); see also infra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that "people deviate
dramatically from rationality with respect to risk behavior").
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found an additional faculty necessary to bridge the gap between in-
sight and behavior: the will."
A. The Cognitive View of Will Is Hierarchical
Cognitive psychology thinks of will as an executive at the top of a
hierarchy, which is similar to the common-sense understanding of the
concept. Elizabethan political philosophers, for instance, revealed
their view of the self by their analogies of states to selves: there was a
monarch on top (the brain) who gave orders to noble subordinates
(voluntary muscles) who controlled the potentially rebellious masses
(organs like the stomach and genitals). States have since evolved to
be more or less free clearinghouses of their citizens' wishes, in which
leaders bid for votes and the winners negotiate with one another to
deliver what they have bid. A chief executive is a convenience, often
serving at the pleasure of one group of elected leaders or another; she
survives by brokering the interests of these leaders. Leaders of even
36supposedly absolute command structures, like armies or corpora-
tions, 37 are now recognized as unable to rule by fiat, but are obliged to
deploy their influence so as not to lead their followers too far from
where the followers want to go. However, the cognitive-and folk-
models of the self are still monarchical or bureaucratic. Cognitive theo-
rists have posited that self-control is literally an organ like a muscle,
exhausted in the short run by use and strengthened in the long run by
practice, but directed by an unspecified executive that presumably fol-
lows reason. 3 The agent of self-control (or "self-regulation") suppos-
34 A will is still not universally held to be necessary for rational conduct. See
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 68-69 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1984) (1949) (assert-
ing that will is a superfluous concept); Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of
Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 685-92 (1988) (arguing that straightforward
economic incentives can account for decisions not to consume addictive goods, with-
out appealing to a self-control process).
EUsTACE M. TILLYARD, THE ELIZABETHAN WORLD PICTURE 96-99 (1960).
36 See Geoffrey Brennan & Gordon Tullock, An Economic Theory of Militaly Tactics:
Methodological Individualism at War, 3J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORO. 225, 226 (1982) ("Armies
must be analyzed as collections of independent individuals who are, in some senses, as
much at war with one another and their own leaders as they are with enemy forces.").
37 See NILS BRUNSSON, THE IRRATIONAL ORGANIZATION 10-21 (1985) (arguing that
there is no automatic link between a corporate decision maker's choice and organiza-
tional action).
38 See Mark Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited
Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247, 248 (2000) (as-
serting that "[tihe resource needed for self-control is a limited, consumable strength,
much like a muscle's ability to work").
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edly stands above motives and picks and chooses from them without
being coerced by them:
Misregulation occurs because [people] operate on the basis of false as-
sumptions about themselves and about the world, because they try to
control things that cannot be directly controlled, or because they give
priority to emotions while neglecting more important and fundamental
39
problems.
According to cognitive theorists, "desires" such as emotions are
only a reason to make a decision, and a rather disparaged reason at
that, rather than the reason. Implied is a cognitive homunculus that
evaluates desire together with a number of other motives for deciding
and makes an autonomous choice.
B. Neurophysiology Says Little of the Will
Neurophysiological techniques demonstrate changes of cortical
activity in muscle-control centers when a subject plans body move-40O4
ments or even observes movements by another person.4 ' These ob-
servations are sometimes described as correlates of will,42 but this is
will in the trivial sense of intentionality. This brain activity does in-
volve the kind of temporal perspective that has been called "prospec-
tive memory"43 and may involve the suppression of alternative action
44plans, but so far, neurophysiology has told us almost nothing about
how people make their choices consistent.
39 Roy F. Baumeister & Todd F. Heatherton, Self-Regulation Failure: An Overview, 7
PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1, 13 (1996).
40 See Lfider Deecke & Wilfried Lang, Generation of Movement-Related Potentials and
Fields in the Supplementary Sensorimotor Area and the Primary Motor Area, 70 ADvANCES
NEUROLOGY 127, 127 (1996) ("Modern neurophysiologic techniques enable us to
study changes in cortical activity in association with specific motor or cognitive func-
tions."); Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, 6 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 47, 49
(1999) ("The brain... begin[s] the volitional process in [a] voluntary act well before
the activation of the muscle that produce [s] the movement.").
41 See Wolfgang Prinz, Perception and Action Planning, 9 EUR. J. COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
129, 129-54 (1997) (arguing that the brain reacts in a common manner to a percep-
tion of a neighbor's action and to a plan of action by the subject herself).
42 See David H. Ingvar, On Volition: A Neurophysiologically Oriented Essay, 6 J.
CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 1, 2-4 (1999) (describing the neurophysiological aspects of wol-
untary movement).
43 For a collection of articles discussing "prospective memory," see PROSPECTIVE
MEMORY (Maria Brandimonte et al. eds., 1996).
44 See C.D. Frith et al., Willed Action and the Prefrontal Cortex in Man: A Study with
PET, 244 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SC. 241, 241-46 (1991) (studying brain activity for willed
acts where subjects had to make a choice between actions in comparison with activity
for routine actions).
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C. Parametric Behavioral Data Provide a Basis for Will
Hyperbolic discounting suggests a different and more explicit ex-
planation than the hierarchical model of what executive functions do.
If contradictory rewards often select for incompatible behaviors, then
executive functioning must be more than just a matter of finding out
the sizes of available rewards and directing efforts toward them. Ex-
ecutive functioning means resolving the conflicts and inconsistencies
that these learned processes generate. Hyperbolic curves per se can
be expected to turn reward-seeking into a free-for-all in a population
of successive, incompatible processes. Processes that are learned
when one reward is dominant have to include means to actively un-
dermine rival processes, which were learned when an incompatible
reward was dominant.5 The processes that are learned to obtain one
reward-the interest in that reward46 -must behave strategically toward
the interest in a differently timed alternative in just the same way that
interests contend with one another in a body politic. They must in-
corporate processes that forestall rival processes as they bid for accep-
tance in an internal marketplace. Consequently, the study of an indi-
vidual's choice making and choice maintaining must resemble the
study of interpersonal marketplaces, a micromicroeconomics or pico-
economics.
47
The simplest measure that can be taken against a competing in-
terest is to alter the environment in order to create a commitment to a
current preference. A current preference for eating in moderation
can be secured by undergoing gastric bypass surgery or, less perma-
nently, by checking into a "fat farm." Typically, though, the commit-
ment is less definitive, retaining the possibility of reversal, but chang-
ing the contingencies to make the alternative interest less attractive to
the future self. Buying only healthy food at the supermarket does not
guarantee that you will not go on a late night junk food binge, but it
Thus, they predict the multiple selves postulated by Richard Posner, Are We One
Self or Multiple Selves? inplications for Law and Public Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 24-25
(1997), and others before him, see, e.g., THE MULTIPLE SELF (ion Elster ed., 1986) (ex-
ploring theories of the individual as a collection of "several selves"). Posner doubts the
theoretical necessity of hyperbolic curves themselves to account for preference reversal
as a function of time, Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1555-56 (1998), but his alternative explanation, informa-
tion cost, would not account for the emergence of warring "present-oriented" versus
"future-oriented" selves.
46 See AINSLIE, supra note S0, at 42-44 ("[T]he mental operations selected for by a
particular kind of reward [can be called] the person's 'interest' in that award.").
47 ld. at 47.
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adds the disincentive of having to go to a store when the urge strikes.
Proclaiming to your friends that you will never eat meat again does
not eliminate it as an option. Instead, it adds a new cost-that of los-
ing face. David Laibson has suggested that a need for this kind of
commitment explains people's otherwise unaccountable preference
for relatively illiquid investments."' Similar behavior has been demon-
strated in pigeons, suggesting that a conflict of enduring long- and
short-range interests is an elementary consequence of hyperbolic dis-
count curves: Some pigeons that consistently choose (through the
peck of a key) a lesser but immediate food reward over a greater but
delayed food reward also peck a key in advance of the choice when it
eliminates the future availability of the lesser, immediate reward. 9 At
the time the committing key is presented, the discounted value of the
greater but delayed food reward is the more compelling alternative
(see the portion of Figure 1 to the left of where the discount curves
intersect). Two other committing methods are also straightforward:• 0
(1) keeping your attention off of temptations, either consciously or
in the Freudian defense mechanisms of suppression, repression, and
denial; and (2) preparing your emotions, either consciously ' or in the
defense mechanisms of isolation and reversal of effect.
While strategic commitment might fit into the broad class of ex-
ecutive functions, it is not ordinarily labeled as "willpower." Indeed it
could more reasonably be classified as a technique that eliminates the
need for willpower. Understanding willpower requires an understand-
ing of dynamic strategic interaction across successive motivational
states. Writers since antiquity have related self-control to choosing ac-
cording to principle, that is, choosing in categories containing a
number of expectable choices rather than just the choice at hand.
For example, Aristotle said that incontinence (akrasia) was the result
of choosing according to "particulars" instead of "universals" ;12 Kant
48 David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 1] 12 Q.J. ECON. 443, 443-45
(1997).
49 George Ainslie, Impulse Control in Pigeons, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV.
485, 488 (1974).
50 See, e.g., Jane Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of
Gratification: Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REv. 3, 3-19 (1999) (describing chil-
dren's deliberate efforts at attention control).
51 See Harriet Nerlove Mischel & Walter Mischel, The Development of Children's-
Knowledge of Self-Control Strategies, 54 CHILD DEV. 603, 603-19 (1983) (discussing chil-
dren's awareness of needing "cool thoughts" to control themselves in "delay-of
gratification situations").
52 2 ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729,
1811-13 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
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said that the highest kind of decision making involved making all
choices as if they defined universal rules;51 the early psychologist Sully
explained how "action becomes pervaded by principle" so that will is
unified when "[p] articular actions... are viewed as members of a
class of actions subserving one comprehensive end.'
These writers' fundamental insight is that you increase your self-
control by choosing according to category rather than on a case-by-
case basis. You may prefer to be a nonsmoker generally, even though,
considering only an individual choice, you prefer to smoke. But just
such an effect is predicted by hyperbolic discount curves. Although
hyperbolae spike up sharply in the period just before a reward is due
and are thus exquisitely sensitive to short delays, their tails are higher
and more level than the tails of exponential curves at long delays.
The relatively high tails of hyperbolic curves imply a potential for
great increases in value if a number of expected future rewards are
added together. Exponential curves keep declining relentlessly at a
constant proportion of their remaining height for every unit of time
that passes. Hyperbolic curves level off. The height of their tails
means that curves from a series of alternative rewards, if bundled to-
gether, will favor the larger-later rewards increasingly as the series
lengthens (Figure 2A) . By contrast, exponential curves do not pre-
dict increased tolerance for delay with summation of a series of
choices (Figure 2B).
Recent experiments confirm a greater tolerance for delay with
bundled rewards. Kirby and Guastello gave college students choices
between smaller-earlier rewards-of money in one experiment, food
in another-and larger but more delayed alternatives. In one condi-
tion, the same choice was given five times, each time separated by a
week. In another condition, a single choice was made on the first
week between the two alternatives for all five weeks at once. As pre-
dicted from the summation of hyperbolically discounted rewards,
preference for the larger-later alternative was increased in the condi-
53 IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 18-20
(Theodore M. Green & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper Torchbooks 1960) (1934).
54 JAMES SULLY, OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY 631 (New York, D. Appleton & Co.
1891).
5 There is behavioral evidence that the discounted effects of a series of rewards
simply add. E.g.,James E. Mazur, Choice, Delay, Probability, and Conditioned Reinforcement,
25 ANIMAL LEARNING & BEHAV. 131, 141-43 (1997).
56 Kris N. Kirby & Barbarose Guastello, Making Choices in Anticipation of Similar Fu-
lure Choices Can Increase Self-Control, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 154, 154
(2001).
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tion in which a series of choices was bundled together. We recently
demonstrated the same phenomenon in rats, again showing that the
implications of hyperbolic discounting do not depend on human cul-
ture. Eight rats were run through two conditions of a procedure de-
signed to determine how many milliliters of sugar water immediately
was equal in value to 150 milliliters after a three-second interval. In
one condition of the procedure, rats made choices on a trial-by-trial
basis, while in another condition, their choice determined the reward
that they would receive for three consecutive trials. As predicted by
hyperbolic discounting, all subjects tolerated more delay when the
choices were bundled together.
Figure 2A
T in
Tnne -- 9
Summed hyperbolic curves from a series of larger-later rewards and a series of
smaller-earlier alternatives (vertical hatched lines). Each curve depicts the
summed discounted values of all future (more to the right) rewards in the series.
As the series gets longer and the summed curves peak higher above the current re-
wards, the initial period of temporary preference for the series of smaller rewards
shrinks to virtually zero. (Compare the curves just before the first short vertical
hatched line with that at the top of the the last short vertical hatched line.) The
curves from the last (right-hand) pair of rewards are the same as in Figure 1.
57 George Ainslie & John Monterosso, Building Blocks of Self Control: Increased Toler-
ance for Delay with Bundled Rewards, 79J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIs BEHAv. 37 (2003).
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Figure 2B
Time
Summed exponential curves from the same series of paired alternative rewards
(vertical hatched lines). Summing increases their heights as the series get longer
(more to the left), but does not change their relative heights. (This would also be
true if the curves were so steep that the smaller-earlier rewards were preferred; but
in that case summing would add little to their total height, anyway, because the
tails of exponential curves are so low.)
D. Intertemporal Bargaining Enforces Principles
Thus, better, but more delayed, alternatives are more attractive
when presented as a whole category of choices than they are individu-
ally; accordingly, a choice according to a general principle should fa-
vor such alternatives. However, a piece of the puzzle is still missing: If
a person is a population of reward-seeking processes that have been
learned wherever they are rewarded, what could make this throng
choose according to principle? The need to explain principled
choice is what usually makes theorists postulate innate executive proc-
esses-an organ like the ego. But what would empower an ego to ap-
ply a principle if it were powerless against the temporary preference to
begin with? Such a theoretical organ fails to explain the selective
power that even a hierarchical decision-making model needs, much
less a marketplace model. Fortunately, hyperbolic discount curves
suggest a way that the internal marketplace could, from its own basic
properties, motivate the formation of the familiar executive processes.
If we imagine a Hobbesian state of nature within the individual,
before the existence of an ego, then the life of any long-range plan
will be short. Before it reaches its goal, an incompatible plan will be-
come more attractive at some point. A child who wants friends may
have too many urges to be selfish. Someone who wants to lose weight
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may encounter too many tempting foods. An imminent payoff for an
individual act of selfishness or particular snack is apt to be worth the
little damage it does to friendships or the minor weight gain it causes.
It would probably not be worth losing all expectation of friendship or
slimness, but such huge outcomes are rarely the necessary conse-
quence of individual choices. Therefore, in the state of nature, a per-
son remains riddled with impulses. There is no incentive to plan be-
cause plans are usually rendered idle by the experience of reversing
preferences.
However, an astute person-or someone who borrows the astute-
ness of her culture-is aware that her preferences are volatile. The
best way she has to predict what she will do in the face of a future
temptation is to see what she does with a similar temptation in the
present: An act of selfishness predicts further selfishness and the
eventual loss of friendship with all but the most long-suffering people.
The snack predicts future snacks and inevitable weight gain. How-
ever, insofar as she is responsive to this rough insight about self-
prediction, her current choices will become test cases-choices about
selfishness and eating that this elementary insight will bundle together
to form expected series of outcomes. When she chooses to be selfish,
she chooses an expectation of future selfishness as well, and when she
overeats, the act bodes more overeating. She will seem to be choosing
according to principle, but what literally happens is that her successive
selves form a repeated prisoner's dilemma relationship, which they
come to solve in the same way as tacit interpersonal bargainers do.
Each expects future selves to perceive the current choice as a prece-
dent for cooperation or defection, and this expectation adds to those
incentives that depend on that choice alone."
Our hypothesis is that the will is an intertemporal bargaining
situation, dependent for its force on a person's recursive evaluations
of the prospects for her own behavior. Such an internally fed-back
process is probably impossible to study with controlled experiments.
However, it fits descriptions of will over the centuries better than
other published theories of will and solves thought experiments that
have otherwise seemed paradoxical in the philosophy of mind 9
58 The terms of the prisoner's dilemma must be modified slightly to deal with the
fact that future selves cannot retaliate strategically against past selves. See AINSLIE, sit-
pra note 30, at 92-93 (explaining that the prospect of defections by future selves,
though motivated purely by their own future prospects, serves in practice as a threat of
punishment).
59 See id. at 126-29, 134-39, for discussions of Kavka's problem and Newcomb's
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Thought experiments may prove to be a particularly useful way of
isolating the active ingredient of subtle incentives like the value of
precedents: Imagine that you are a smoker who is trying to quit but
who craves a cigarette. Suppose that an angel appears to you and says
that you are destined to smoke a pack a day beginning tomorrow.
Given this certainty, you would have no incentive to turn down the de-
sired cigarette today-it would seem pointless. What if the angel re-
vealed instead that you were never to smoke again after today? Here,
too, there seems to be little incentive to turn down the cigarette-it
would be harmless. Fixing future smoking choices in either direction
evidently makes smoking the dominant current choice over not smok-
ing. Only if your future smoking is in doubt does a current abstention
seem worth the effort. But its importance cannot come from any
physical consequences for future choices-hence the conclusion that
it matters as a precedent. Indeed when Kirby and Guastello merely
suggested to student subjects that the subjects' current choices might
serve as predictions of their future choices, preference for larger-later
alternatives increased, although not as much as when the experiment-
ers bundled the choices directly.60
The more explicit a person's perception that a current choice
predicts a category of future ones, the more that perception will be
true. A choice that you see as a test case will obviously carry more
weight as an omen than a choice that is merely a random example,
and a random example of a specific category will carry more weight
than an isolated whim. Reiteration of this phenomenon can be ex-
pected to operate as a positive feedback system that increasingly dis-
tinguishes choices that are more systematic or principled from choices
that are mostly spontaneous. According to our hypothesis, the mental
processes involved in recognizing test cases and discerning their scope
are the basic executive functions: Is selfishness forbidden even toward
my rivals? Does a lapse in my diet reduce my will to not smoke as well?
The shaping of the mental processes that answer such questions is
based on the increased expectation of the long-range reward that such
processes create. By brokering, in effect, large categories of expected
reward (e.g., the aggregated expected value of the pleasures and suf-
fering of being a smoker), they have the power to license and forbid
behaviors. These executive functions, like the executives of parlia-
mentary democracies, serve. at the pleasure of the interests they gov-
problem. We deal below with the problem of free will, which can be seen as a similar
thouht experiment.
6 Kirby & Guastello, supra note 56, at 160.
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ern. The marketplace of motivated behavior has produced ego func-
tions, much as Freud envisioned.'
E. Recursive Self-Prediction Can Generate the Experience of Freedom of Will
If future events were discounted exponentially, there would be no
reason to make and enforce the personal rules by which you evaluate
decisions as precedents. You could make a plan with the expectation
that you would follow it, or, if circumstances change, modify it in a
way that you currently have no reason to forestall. Your past and fu-
ture selves would cooperate in an unbroken chain; their success in
maximizing your good would be limited only by imperfect informa-
tion or power. But with hyperbolic discounting you face a future that
is chaotic, not only in the common meaning of the term, but also in
its technical meaning: Your stream of future choices is sensitively de-
pendent on your current one in that your current choice may send the
stream in a wildly different direction than it seemed to be heading. 6
2
The greater your perception of how your choices matter as prece-
dents, the greater this sensitive dependence.
Hyperbolic discounting makes decision making a crowd phe-
nomenon, with the crowd consisting of the successive dispositions to
choose that the individual has over time. At each moment you make
the choice that looks best for you; but a big part of this picture is your
expectation of how this choice will influence your choice at later
times, an expectation that is mostly founded on the effects of your
previous choices. Participation in the acts of this crowd of successive
choice makers is a self-referential process, hidden from the outside
observer and even from you yourself while facing it in advance. You
can never be sure how your own future self will choose; you may read
a small sign of faltering as your cue to bail out-that is, to stop coop-
erating with later selves on a given plan-just as investors may see a
small drop in stock's price as a signal to start a massive sell-off. Or you
may not. You will not know until it happens.
61 See SIGMUND FREUD, FORMULATION ON THE Two PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL
FUNCTIONING (1911) ("[T]he substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure
principle implies no deposing of the pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of
it."), reprinted in 12 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS
OF SIGMUND FREUD 213, 223 (James Strachey ed. & trans., Hogarth Press 1995) (1958).
62 See Susan Ayers, The Application of Chaos Theoy to Psychology, 7 THEORY &
PSYCHOL. 373, 376 (1997) (explaining how "small changes in initial conditions [can]
have large effects").
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Intertemporal bargaining creates shifting trains of choices and
consequences that could not be predicted from mere summation of
the relevant motives. Behavior becomes like the weather-often pre-
dictable in the immediate future if you have a good knowledge of its
driving forces, but subject to sudden shifts that are compounded re-
cursively, making it unpredictable from a distance. If being unpre-
dictable in principle is the necessary quality of a free will,c3 this bar-
gaining may be what elicits free will from an underlying determinism.
Of course, mere dependency on internal feedback processes does
not create the feeling of being a self:
[I]f chaos-type data can be used to justify the existence of free will in
humans, they can also be used to justify the existence of free will in cha-
otic pendulums, weather systems, leaf distributions, and mathematical
equations.
That is, even internal feedback processes, if they do not engage what
feels like your self, will be experienced as random, "more like epilep-
tic seizures than free, responsible choices. '  We are arguing that in-
tertemporal bargaining supplies that element of engagement: that
your own motivation-in many cases emotion-is what you are pre-
dicting.
In conventional accounts, will is an irreducible process that does
not-and indeed could not-predict itself:
Making a decision and predicting that decision are mental states that ex-
clude each other in the same mind, since making a decision implies, by
the very meaning of the term, uncertainty as to what one is going to do.
But hyperbolic discounting turns predicting a decision into an inte-
gral part of making that decision. Indeed, the only thing that differ-
entiates making decisions from following whims becomes discernment
of the self-referential consequences that are at stake (i.e., your expec-
tations of your own future choices). Thus the prominence of the per-
son's recursive intertemporal bargaining process reconciles determin-
63 See DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH
WANTING 151-52 (1984) (explaining how "chaotic systems are the source of the 'prac-
tical' .. independence of things that shuffles the world").
A.A. Sappington, Recent Psychological Approaches to the Free Will Versus Determinism
Issue, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 19, 27 (1990).
65 Robert Kane, Two Kinds of Incompatibilism, 50 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs.
219,231 (1989).
66 Arthur Pap, Deterninism, Freedom, Moral Responsibility, and Causal Talk, in
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THIE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 200, 201 (Sidney Hook
ed., 1958).
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ism with the experience of free will. Although clearly pulled by identi-
fiable motives, a person's choice in such a process cannot be pre-
dicted with certainty, even by the person herself. Nevertheless, choice
is as strictly determined as the weather.
IV. THE WILL DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOSTER RATIONALITY
Unfortunately, a person's perception of the intertemporal pris-
oner's dilemma relationship-and the willpower that results from this
perception-cannot simply cure the problem of temporary prefer-
ence. Willpower may be the best way we know to stabilize choice, but
the intertemporal bargaining model predicts that it will also have seri-
ous side effects-side effects that have been observed by clinicians.
Such bargaining does not let us estimate our best prospects from
moment to moment as truly exponential discounting would. Rather,
it formalizes internal conflict, making some self-control problems bet-
ter, but some worse.
A. The Will Maneuver Has Costly Side Effects
These side effects need to be discussed. Where they are noticed at
all, they are not recognized as the consequence of using willpower. In
a dangerous split of awareness, people tend to see willpower as an
unmixed blessing that bears no relation to abnormal symptoms such
as loss of emotional immediacy, abandonment of control in particular
areas of behavior, blindness toward one's own motives, or decreased
responsiveness to subtle rewards. We argue that just these four distor-
tions are to be expected to a greater or lesser extent from a reliance
on personal rules. They may even go so far as to make a given per-
son's willpower a net liability to her.
1. Rules Overshadow Goods-in-Themselves
The perception of a choice as a precedent often makes it much
more important for its effect on future expectations than for the re-
wards that intrinsically depend on it. When this is true, your choices
will become detached from their immediate outcomes and take on an
aloof, legalistic quality. Ainslie has argued that this legalism underlies
the self-control style that clinicians call compulsive." It is a polar op-
67 AINSLIE, supra note 30, at 205-25.
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posite from impulsive temporary preferences, despite a usage that er-
ratically equates them (e.g., "compulsive drinking").
It is often hard to guess how you will interpret a current choice
when looking back on it. Did eating that sandwich violate your diet or
not? Where your rules' criteria are ambiguous, cooperation with your
future selves is apt to be both rigid and unstable. Unless you can find
clear lines to use as boundaries, you may be uncertain as to whether,
facing a choice in the future, you will look back at your current choice
and judge it to have been a lapse. Under the influence of an immi-
nent reward, you may claim an exception to a rule but later think you
fooled yourself; that is, see yourself as having had a lapse. Conversely,
you may be cautious beyond what your long-range interest requires
out of fear that you will later see your choice as a lapse. This rationale
exacerbates compulsiveness. Every lapse reduces your ability to follow
a personal rule, and every observance reduces your ability not to. Er-
rors in either direction impose costs that would never result from ex-
ponential curves, since those curves would not make choice depend
on recursive self-prediction in the first place.
2. Rules Magnify Lapses
When you violate a personal rule, the cost is a fall in your prospect
of getting the long-range rewards on which it was based. But this
prospect is what you have been using to stake against the relevant im-
pulses. A lapse suggests that your will is weak, a diagnosis that may act
recursively to weaken your will. After weeks in which the expected
value of a future without smoking was enough to win out over the
immediate value of smoking, a moment comes in which the occasion
to smoke is so attractive as to make it the more powerful of the in-
compatible interests. This one choice can affect the stream of future
choices; for some time to come the prospect of future abstinence may
not be sufficiently credible to offer much of a stake against the imme-
diate reward of smoking. One lapse thus weakens the will, an out-
come that has been called "the abstinence violation effect.
6 8
To save your expectation of controlling yourself generally, you will
be strongly motivated to find a line that excludes from your larger
rule the kind of choice where your will failed. This means attributing
the lapse to a particular aspect of your present situation, even though
(I G. Alan Marlatt & Judith R. Gordon, Determinants of Relapse: hnplications for the
Maintenance of Behavior Change, in BEHAVIORAL MEDICINE: CHANGING HEALTH
LIFESTYsLEs 410,410-27 (Parle 0. Davidson & Sheena M. Davidson eds., 1980).
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it will make self-control much more difficult when that aspect is pres-
ent in the future. You may decide that you cannot resist the urge to
panic when speaking in public, or to lose your temper at incompetent
clerks, or to stop a doughnut binge once begun. Your discrimination
of this special area has a perverse effect, since within it you see only
failure predicting further failure. If you no longer have the prospect
that your rule will hold here, these urges will seem to command obe-
dience automatically without an intervening moment of choice.
Where such encapsulated impulses are clinically significant, they get
called a symptom-for instance, a phobia, a dyscontrol, or a substance
dependence.
Thus, the perception of repeated prisoner's dilemmas stabilizes
not only long-range plans but lapses as well.69 An alternative, cognitive
model of self-control failure based on exhaustion of "strength"70 does
not account for regular failure that is specific to a particular circum-
stance.
3. Rules Motivate Misperception
Personal rules depend heavily on perception-noticing and re-
membering your choices, the circumstances in which you made them,
and their similarity to the circumstances of other choices. And since
personal rules organize great amounts of motivation, they naturally
create temptations for you to suborn the perception process. When a
lapse is occurring or has occurred, it will often be in both your long-
and short-range interests not to recognize that fact. Your short-range
interest is to keep the lapse from being detected so as not to invite at-
tempts to stop it. Your long-range interest is also, at least partially, to
keep the lapse from being detected. Acknowledging that a lapse has
occurred would lower the expectation of self-control that you need to
stake against future impulses.
After a lapse, the long-range interest is in the same awkward posi-
tion as that of a country that previously threatened to go to war under
a particular set of circumstances, which then materialized. The coun-
try wants to avoid war without destroying the credibility of its threat
and may therefore look for ways to be seen as not having detected the
circumstance. Your long-range interest will suffer if you catch yourself
69 See AINSLIE, supra note 30, at 91-97 (discussing effects of prisoner's dilemmas).
70 See Roy F. Baumeister & Todd F. Heatherton, Self-Regulation Failure: An Overview,
7 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 1, 3 (1996) (hypothesizing that "strength" at a given moment is at
the same level for all endeavors).
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ignoring a lapse, but perhaps not if you can arrange to ignore it with-
out catching yourself. This arrangement, too, must go undetected;
therefore, a successful process of ignoring must be among the many
mental expedients that arise by trial and error-the ones you keep
simply because they make you feel better without realizing why. As a
result, money disappears despite a strict budget, and people who "eat
like a bird" mysteriously gain weight.
4. Rules May Serve Compulsions
The fact that a decision comes to be worth more as a precedent
than it is worth in its own right does not necessarily imply that it is the
wrong decision. On the contrary, you would think from the logic of
summing discount curves that the evaluation of choices in whole cate-
gories rather than by themselves would have to improve your overall
rate of reward (Figure 2A). Cooperation in a repetitive prisoner's di-
lemma would have to serve the players' long-range interests or else
they would abandon it. How, then, can self-enforcing rules for in-
tertemporal cooperation ever become prisons? Why should anyone
ever conclude that she was trapped by her rules and even hire a psy-
chotherapist to free herself from a "punitive superego"?
The most likely answer is that a person can discern many possible
precedents in a given situation, and the way of grouping choices that
finally inspires intertemporal cooperation need not be the most pro-
ductive. This is because of the selective effect of distinctness: Per-
sonal rules operate most effectively on distinct, countable goals. A
rule can be self-enforcing only if each criterion for having followed it
yields an unambiguous either/or test. A rule to maximize a good will
be effective only if the good can be clearly quantified; thus, the ease of
comparing all financial transactions makes the money fluctuate less
over time than, say, the value of an angry outburst or of a night's
sleep. The motivational impact of a prospective series of moods has to
be much less than that of an equally long series of cash purchases.
So, cooperation among successive motivational states does not
necessarily bring the most reward in the long run. The mechanics of
policing this cooperation may produce the intrapsychic equivalent of
regimentation, which will increase your efficiency at reward getting in
the categories you have defined, but reduce your sensitivity to less eas-
ily categorized kinds of reward.
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B. These Side Effects Cause Pure Will to Fall Short of Rationality
The attempt to optimize your prospects with personal rules con-
fronts you with the paradox of definition-that to define a concept is
to alter it, in this case toward something more formalized. If you con-
clude that you should maximize money, you become a miser; if you
rule that you should minimize your vulnerability to emotional influ-
ence, you will develop the numbing insensitivity that clinicians have
named alexithymia;7' if you conclude that you should minimize risk,
you become obsessively careful; and so forth. The logic of rules may
come to so overshadow your responsiveness to experience that your
behavior becomes formal and inefficient. A miser's strict rules for
thrift make her too rigid to optimize her chances in a competitive
market, and even a daring financier undermines the productiveness
of her capital if she rules that she must maximize each year's profit.
7 2
Similarly, strict autonomy means shielding yourself against exploita-
tion by others' abilities to invoke your passions. But alexithymics can-
not use the richest strategy available for maximizing emotional re-
ward-the cultivation of human relationships. 7 Likewise, avoidance
of danger at any cost is poor risk management.
In this way, a person who depends on willpower for impulse con-
trol is in danger of being coerced by logic that does not serve what she
herself regards as her best interests. Concrete rules dominate subtle
intuitions, and even though she has a sense that she will regret having
sold out to them, she faces the immediate danger of succumbing to
short-range urges, like addictions, if she does not. If she has not
learned ways of categorizing choices that permit subtle criteria to hold
their own against concrete tests for intertemporal cooperation, the
implications of these tests will make her compulsive.
To summarize our hypothesis of the origin and nature of "ego
functions": A person moves beyond the state of nature by discovering
self-prediction, and thus adds strategic considerations to her incen-
71 See generally John C. Nemiah, Alexithymia: Theoretical Considerations, 28
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 199 (1977) (discussing theoretical models appli-
cable to alexithymia).
72 See Ali R. Malekzadeh & Afsaneh Nahavandi, Merger Mania: Who Wins? Who
Loses?, 8J. Bus. STRATEGY 76, 79 (1987) (reporting that the discipline of always maxi-
mizing annual profit is counterproductive).
See George Ainslie, A Utility-Maximizing Mechanism for Vicarious Reward: Comments
onjulian Simon's "Interpersonal Allocation Continuous with Intertemporal Allocation,"
7 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 393, 393 (1995) (noting that the "richest source of external
occasions to gamble on is the apparent experience of other people").
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tives for choice. Bundling choices into categories of related prece-
dents increases her long-range reward, but if she puts too much reli-
ance on explicit personal rules, the four side effects of this reliance
may do as much harm to her longest-range interest 74 as her original
inconsistency did. It will be in her longest-range interest to learn pro-
cesses beyond simple categorization, in order to balance the value of
consistency against that of flexibility and spontaneity, and to balance
the value of defining precedents against that of other ways to influ-
ence future selves. The need for such subtlety further shapes the ex-
ecutive faculty that must serve at the pleasure of its constituents-in-
deed, literally depends upon their pleasure. The self, as defined
behaviorally, could be considered inborn only inasmuch as the hyper-
bolic discount function that creates the incentive to learn intertempo-
ral bargaining skills is inborn.
C. Overreliance on Will May Foster Addictions
Modern culture has been slow to recognize the dilemma of per-
sonal rules: that we are endangered by our willpower as well as by our
impulses. For instance, modern writers wring their hands about both
the average citizen's rising body mass index and the prevalence of di-
eting in the young,7" without noting the implication that the enemy is
now approaching from two opposite directions.
In the interpersonal realm, the dangers of rules are much better
known. The English long ago established courts of equity to correct
distortions that arose from the rigidity of laws, and the great social
rule maker Jeremy Bentham cautioned that rules should not be fully
binding.7" A recent review by Cass Sunstein makes it clear that social
control by rules creates side effects analogous to our problems 1, 3,
and 4: the need for preserving precedents makes rules too rigid; this
rigidity "drive[s] discretion underground" into transactions that are
74 We assume the longest-range interest to be a single, unitary interest, because
the tails of hyperbolic curves are proportional to the objective-that is, nondelayed-
Values of rewards when the times to the alternatives are much greater than the times
between them. Preference among distant alternatives should be stable as long as they
remain distant.
75 See, e.g., RICHARD A. GORDON, ANOREXIA AND BULIMIA: ANATOMY OF A SOCIAL
EPIDEMIC (1990) (noting the increasing pressure on young women to conform them-
selves to an unrealistic body-ideal); Cara B. Ebbeling et al., Childhood Obesity: Public-
Health Crisis, Common Sense Cure, 360 LANCET 473, 473 (2002) (discussing the preva-
lence of childhood obesity).
76 Cass R. Sunstein, Problem with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1007 (1995) (citing
GERALDJ. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 418-21(1986)).
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not a matter of record; and the need to use available bright lines be-
tween what is and is not permissible both forbids innocuous activities
and licenses cleverly defined harmful ones.77 This last side effect is by
no means confined to the realm of law. Quality assurance programs
that focus doctors' motivation increasingly on measurable indicators
of quality are reducing their clinical intuitiveness. Problem 2, as
well, is evident in the interpersonal sphere. For instance, some poten-
tial drug addicts may be saved by legal deterrence, but many who are
not deterred become identified criminals and are worse off than they
would be if drugs were not illegal.
The robustness of suboptimal rules may sometimes let addictions
serve long-range interests. Better to be fat, you might think, than an-
orectic. Your will may become so confining that a pattern of regular
lapses actually makes you better off in the long run. The lore of ad-
dictionology often attributes bingeing to a patient's inhibitedness in
the rest of her life. General overcontrol is said to set up periodic epi-
sodes of breaking loose. The model of intertemporal bargaining pre-
dicted by hyperbolic discount curves v' provides a specific rationale for
this pattern. Rules that eliminate any large source of emotional re-
ward will create a proportional motive for you to bypass or break those
rules. If those rules have, in William James's phrase, "grown too nar-
row for the actual case, ' even your long-range interest will lie in par-
tially escaping from them.
Thus, personal rules that become compulsions can create what are
in effect alliances between long- and short-range interests. The per-
son's occasional binge comes to serve as a corrective to the compara-
tive sterility of such rules, a means of providing richer experiences
than these rules allow, while its transient nature still limits the damage
it does. The longest-range interest of an alcoholic who is too rigid
when sober may be to tacitly foster the cycle of drunkenness and so-
briety, rather than be continuously imprisoned by her rules.
Alcoholics are sometimes described as nicer, or more genuinely
creative, or more fully human when drunk. Furthermore, some ad-
77 Id. at 994 (discussing the overinclusive and underinclusive aspects of rules).
78 Lawrence P. Casalino, The Unintended Consequences of Measuring Quality on the
Quality of Medical Care, 341 NEWENG.J. MED. 1147,1148-49 (1999).
79 See supra Part II (discussing the role of temporal delays in creating hyperbolic
preference curves).
80 Thomas Taffe, Education of the Heart, 45 CROSS CURRENTS 380, 383 (1995) (quot-
ing WILLIAM JAMES, The Moral Philosopher and Moral Life, in THE WILL TO BELIEVE 184,
209 (Longman, Green & Co. 1927) (1896)).
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dicts plan binges in advance. Such people may believe that their
binges are undesirable-indeed, "rationality" will almost certainly dic-
tate such a belief-but the therapists they hire find them mysteriously
unresponsive to treatment. The patient who arranges for drinking
several days in advance-who goes off the disulfiram that commits her
to sickness if she drinks, for instance, or who brings bottles to her re-
habilitation program for later use-cannot simply be yielding to a
short-range impulse. This is behavioral evidence that she experiences
her particular plan to give up drinking as a stricture which, even at a
distance, appears to need hedging, although she may be unable to re-
port any such thing.
The twin dangers of uncontrolled and overcontrolled behavior
are vividly illustrated in the case of overeating. Most anorectics have
started out by confronting a genuine eating problem"' and have ap-
parently discovered thereby the great sense of power that successful
dieting confers. If they concentrate on maximizing their willpower,
anorectics are apt to seriously reduce their spontaneity and impover-
ish their interpersonal relationships. Those who cannot tolerate the
rigidity of strict anorexia may accept a pattern of binge-and-reform
• 8"7
bulimia much like that of the binge drinker. "
Simply increasing the scope or severity of personal rules does not
make behavior more rational, and almost no psychotherapies attempt
it. Most psychotherapy deals with problems of overcontrol-de-
scribed by psychoanalysts as a punitive superego, by cognitive thera-
pists as overgeneralization and magnification, and by gestalt therapists
81 See Kunio Inanuma, The Development of Anorexia Nervosa, 40 JAPANESE J. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 252, 252 (1999) (noting that dieting is sometimes a precur-
sor to anorexia); Audrey R. Tyrka et al., The Development of Disordered Eating: Correlates
and 1redictars of Eating Problen in the Context of Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 607, 616-17 (ArnoldJ. Sameroffet al. eds., 2d ed.
2000) (noting that "initial dieting" in response to "weight concerns" or "high body
mass" are "significant predictors of subsequent eating disorders").
82 SeeJanet Polivy & C. Peter Herman, Etiology of Binge Eating: Psychological Mecha-
nisms, in BINGE EATING 173, 194-95 (Christopher G. Fairburn & Terence G. Wilson
eds., 1993) (noting that restrictive dieting is often a precondition for the binge-purge
cycle);,Jane H. White, Symptom Development in Bulimia Nervosa: A Comparison of Women
with and Without a Histoiy of Anorexia Nervosa, 14 ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 81, 84
(2000) ("At least 28% of women with [bulimia] have a history of [anorexia] ....").
8.An exception is WILLIAM GLASSER, REALITY THERAPY: A NEW APPROACH TO
PS1CHIATRY 20 (1965) ("The more irresponsible the person, the more he has to learn
about acceptable realistic behavior ....").
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as dependence on cognitive maps8-rather than the simple inability
to give up an impulse.
The tendency of overly concrete rules to keep your will from serv-
ing your longest-range interest is the great flaw of willpower. It sug-
gests why a simplistic policy of "the more willpower, the better" con-
tradicts the experience of many people with dyscontrol problems. To
them, more willpower means less of the human qualities they value
most in themselves. They are able to listen to reason only when rea-
son, as represented by societal or personal rules, stops starving their
own longest-range prospects for emotional satisfaction.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR NORMATIVE RATIONALITY
For exponential discounters, consistency of choice would be a sign
of unqualified success, of having estimated your long-range interest
correctly from the beginning. For a hyperbolic discounter, however,
consistency has a cost, sometimes an irrationally high one. Consis-
tency per se may be foolish, indeed the hobgoblin of small minds. Al-
though rules for consistency must produce reward in the relatively
long range in order to survive, and may defend the person against
impulses that dominate in the much shorter range, they may solidify
behaviors that we would intuitively feel to be irrational; it is these be-
haviors that are experienced as compulsions. If people are hyperbolic
discounters, they can either impulsively squander long range resources
or compulsively imprison themselves for fear of their impulses while still
strictly maximizing their expected discounted utility at every moment.
Specifying optimal choice under these conditions is simple in theory
but difficult in practice.
A. Hyperbolic Discounting Demands a New Conception of Utility
Maximization
Given hyperbolic curves, a single theoretical definition of rational-
ity stands out: the course of action that serves your longest-range in-
terest. This will be the only course that is both intrinsically stable and
has the intuitive advantage that-in the last analysis-you are glad to
have followed it. However, even the long-range choice criterion does
not provide a practical test for rationality. A person may or may not
be able to assess which of her options will give her the most satisfac-
84 These therapies are summarized in RAYMOND J. CORSINI, CURRENT
PSYCHOTHERAPIES 4-17 (3d ed. 1984).
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tion in retrospect;" 5 but even if she could, that answer will not tell her
beforehand which, if any, of her leading long-range prospects will sur-
vive the competition of faster-paying courses of action. She might be
happiest in the long run if she buys an exercise bike and rides it regu-
larly, but she will be least happy if she spends money on the bike and
cannot marshal the motivation to ride it.
If tests of rationality are to provide prescriptions for choice, they
will need to operate within the limits of sound game-theoretic strat-
egy. This is to say that the behavioral economics of choice should not
repeat the mistake of classical economics and evaluate options without
regard to their strategic consequences. Sound macroeconomic choice
evaluates the prospects of equilibria as determined by game theory,"6
and this must be true of picoeconomic choice as well. Evaluated stra-
tegically, rationality depends on which options can dominate other
options for long enough to be realized. Judgments about which op-
tions should be avoided need to be supported by plans that use avail-
able incentives to make sure this avoidance is motivated.
In a recent review of behavioral economics, Christine Jolls, Cass
Sunstein, and Richard Thaler classified the descriptive failures of RCT
in three categories: bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and
bounded self-interest. 7  Picoeconomics deals most directly with
bounded (i.e., limited) willpower, as we have described. Much of
bounded rationality seems to arise from pure cognitive error. 8 How-
85 This limitation is the bounded rationality of Herbert Simon, which is familiar to
conventional utility theory. See Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the
Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REv. 129, 136-38 (1956) (arguing that environmental and
mental restrictions limit the degree of optimization that is achievable in real-life situa-
tions).
86 See generally AMNON RAPOPORT, EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF INTERACTIVE
DECISIONS, at ix (1990) (discussing the "interplay of theory and experimentation on
group decision making in economics"); Vernon Smith, Game Theory and Experimental
Economics: Beginnings and Early Influences, in TOWARD A HISTORY OF GAME THEORY 241,
244 (E. Roy Weintraub ed., 1992) (describing the shift toward the game-theoretic
paradigm in economics).
87 ChristineJolls et al., A Behavioral ApNoach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv.
1471, 1476-79 (1998).
88 For example, people deviate dramatically from rationality with respect to risk
behavior, in part because they do not incorporate base-rate probabilities in the man-
ner delineated in Bayes's theorem. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psy-
chology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 237, 257 (1973) (concluding that "[i]n making
predictions and judgments under uncertainty, people do not appear to follow the cal-
culus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction"). Another widely observed illu-
sion of probability is described in P.C. Wason &J. Evans, Dual Processes in Reasoning?, 3
COGNITION 141, 148-52 (1975), in which the authors note that reliance on an individ-
ual's intuition often occurs at the expense of rational thought.
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ever, some reported examples probably arise from strategic motives,
either serving self-control (as when people pay a premium to keep
money in an illiquid account) "' or evading it (for instance, if the sunk-
cost fallacy evades a personal rule for recognizing loss).9° Hyperbolic
discounting theory also provides a rationale for vicarious experience
as a primary good, which can explain the apparent boundedness of
self-interest.'' Thus a correction for intertemporal bargaining might
allow RCT to account in unified fashion for the greater part of the
anomalies that have confronted it.
This prescription for rationality may include the personal-rule-
governed consistency we have been discussing, but cannot depend on
it exclusively. Rules that are too depriving are apt to fail, and this fail-
ure may either help or hinder your longest-range interest. Someone
with a fear of her own spontaneity might find the greatest retrospec-
tive satisfaction from having faced her fear and renounced some of
her rules for orthodox conduct. Realizing that she will probably not
summon the courage to do this, is she rational to collude with the
urge to go on binges, thereby enjoying some spontaneity but increas-
ing her subsequent fear about how far it will go? It would be hard to
say a priori. Ulysses will feel best in retrospect if he sails close to enjoy
the Sirens' song and continues on, but he is rational in planning to do
so only if he can reliably expect to be tied to his mast.
89 See Christopher Harris & David Laibson, Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers,
69 ECONOMETRICA 935, 937-38 (2001) (commenting that hyperbolic curves help to
explain "pro-savings incentives like 401 (k)s [and the] disproportionately low holds of
liquid assists" among most individuals); see also AINSLIE, supra note 30, at 44
("[H]yperbolic curves make a preference for illiquid savings rational-such savings
serve as commitments.").
90 See AINSLIE, supra note 19, at 291-93 (citing examples of individuals who avoid
acknowledging a loss by counting it as part of a larger, still-viable gamble).
91 A sketch of the argument: To show that empathic satisfactions can be treated
like conventional economic goods, it is necessary to explain how emotional rewards,
although available without fixed stimuli, are actually constrained by some kind of
scarce condition. That scarce condition exists precisely because of hyperbolic discount
curves: Maximal satisfaction from emotional rewards depends on their deferral and
the consequent build-up of appetite for them; hyperbolic discount curves create a re-
lentless urge to harvest these rewards prematurely. Therefore, unless people peg their
emotions to occasions that are both optimally unresponsive to their current wishes and
optimally surprising, their emotional lives will have the highly satiated quality of day-
dreams. The richest source of external occasions to gamble on is the apparent experi-
ence of other people, creating an incentive to "put ourselves in their shoes." AINSLIE,
supra note 30, at 161-74; see also Ainslie, supra note 73, at 399 ("The best source of sur-
prising, unique patterns is the behavior of other people.").
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B. The Law Will Be of Limited Help in Fostering Rational Choices
An intertemporal bargaining model of impulsiveness and self-
control is obviously relevant to the ultimate tool of social control, the
law. However, its implication for action may not be what is apt to be
the reader's first impression: that since people are not intrinsically ra-
tional, the law should add incentives to minimize temporary prefer-
ences for objectively poorer rewards. Hyperbolic discounting merely
represents an experimental explanation of the well-known human
trait once attributed to original sin-weakness of the flesh-and does
not suggest that the solutions the centuries have provided are mis-
guided. As we are about to argue, it only indirectly supports the con-
troversial addition of another goal for criminal la~w-shoring up indi-
vidual self-control, or "protecting you from yourself'-in addition to
the conventionally accepted goals of deterrence, incarceration of the
undeterrable, and gratification of people's wish for retribution. If a
person is a population of partially conflicting interests that come to
equilibria via a process like bargaining, supporting self-control is apt
to be more than a matter of manipulating external incentives. A full
analysis of legal implications is beyond our capabilities, but we should
at least point out intertemporal bargaining theory's predictions of
how an individual will respond to external incentives.
A population of interests that has been engendered by varied in-
centives is naturally divided, with some interests favoring both impulse
and control sides of every major choice. This means that a person will
be receptive to norms that might be useful criteria for personal rules
against temptations, not just social rules to reduce conflict with
neighbors. Granting Robert Scott's point that "behavioral science
does not yet understand the mechanism of internalization [of
norms], " " the demands of intertemporal bargaining (traditionally,
"intrapsychic conflict") will certainly be an important incentive for this
process; these demands will also prove to be an incentive to fit yourself
into a social fabric. In other words, the conflict of short- and long-
range interests will be a motivating factor in the process Robert
Cooter has called "Pareto self-improvement"-the adoption of credi-
ble self-enforcing commitments. Indeed, many behaviors that are
illegal because they harm other people are also short-sighted from the
92 Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L:"
REv. 1603, 1637 (2000).
' Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internal-
izedNorms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1595 (2000).
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viewpoint of individual self-interest. Even in the realm of crimes with
victims, the criminal whose longest-range interest is to victimize other
people is probably the exception rather than the rule; the attractive-
ness of most crime depends on the relative immediacy of its payoff.'
This suggests that even when the law is protecting society from a per-
son, it may be most effective by supporting the person's own longest-
range interest in its competition with shorter-range interests, rather
than threatening the person as a wholehearted wrongdoer. Here is a
rationale for protecting the person from herself, but the process is
tricky.
Authentication as "the Law" makes a norm stand out from other
possible criteria for testing intertemporal cooperation, and thus gives
it especial value9  However, the flip side of a person's need for exter
nal criteria is that she may feel vulnerable to manipulation; makers
and enforcers of laws may seem to threaten her autonomy. If she does
not see a law as serving her interests, the precedent she sets by obey-
ing it may actually undermine her intertemporal cooperation. Like-
wise, even a benevolent authority who upsets a negotiated balance be-
tween the person's long- and short-range interests will undermine the
intertemporal cooperation upon which they have compromised. Ma-
nipulation of incentives that benefits one interest too blatantly may
have the same effect in a person as it does when an outside power
takes a side in a civil war-to motivate middling factions to side with
the opposition in order to preserve the person's, or country's, auton-
omy. Skillful intervention with a person, just as in Jerusalem or
Northern Ireland, involves offering options that all sides find useful.
This often includes providing ways to temper overly rigid rules.
External controls are also harmful in another way. According to
the bargaining theory just presented, the phenomenon of will is gen-
erated by instances in which the person sees each choice as both nec-
essary and sufficient to maintain intertemporal cooperation in an
identifiable category and is thereby motivated to cooperate with her
future selves. Whatever other incentives there are for cooperation, in-
terventions that increase the number of relevant choices strengthen
the will, while those that decrease the number of relevant choices
94 SeeJAMES Q. WILSON & RIciiARDJ. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 49-
56 (1985) (explaining the effect of time discounting on criminal behavior by using a
metaphor of the tendency to choose to eat chocolate cake for the immediate sensory
payoff rather than to wait for the long-term benefits of staying on a diet).
For the role of bright lines in intertemporal bargaining, see AINSLIE, supra note
19, at 162-73.
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weaken it. The incentive for maintaining personal rules is the ex-
pected value of all the better-later outcomes that hinge on obeying
those rules. Where fewer outcomes hinge on a rule (e.g., because ex-
ternal incentives make the rule superfluous), the result will be a
poorly motivated rule. A person may thus respond to the addition of
external incentives by relaxing her own vigilance in the relevant do-
main. The personal rule "don't ever do X" is easily replaced by "don't
do Xwhen you might get caught." In an area where self-control had
been robust and external policing is only marginally practical, this
change might lead her to do more X rather than less. For example,
when proctoring is added to the honor system in exams, it in effect
replaces the existing system.
Because of this perverse effect of coercion, rehabilitation pro-
grams that leave an alcoholic or credit abuser facing manageable
temptations should be more effective than those that rely on external
coercion to lock her up or to take her financial affairs out of her
hands. Where no temptations are manageable at first, a treatment
program should begin with a totally protected phase. This phase
should be followed by a gradual return of the person's autonomy
rather than a sudden confrontation with temptation, as often happens
when a patient is discharged from an inpatient rehabilitation pro-
gram. Any intervention that makes personal willpower less necessary
will need to be followed by gradual exposure to temptations.
Even making committing devices available for a person's own use
may not increase her self-control. It might seem, for instance, that a
person should be able to commit herself contractually to follow
through with a drug program, or lock in her most prudent future
plans, and that courts should enforce these commitments even
though they are unilateral. Some treatment programs have tried this
on an informal basis; 7 but even a physical committing device like di-
sulfiram (Antabuse), which makes alcohol sickening for a period of
days, has been shown not to increase sobriety after one year in the ab-
sence of a highly structured social program.98 Even when a physical
06 Interference with personal rules may be a factor in how extrinsic incentives un-
dermine people's autonomous decision making, an effect that has been widely re-
ported. E.g., EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1985).
97 See, e.g., Roger Paxton, Deposit Contracts with Smokers: Varying Frequency and
Amount of Repayments, 19 BEHIAV. RES. & THERAPY 117 (1981) (describing a program in
which lapsing smokers forfeited money that they had deposited with the therapist).
98 See Richard K. Fuller & Harold P. Roth, Disulfiram for the Treatment of Alcoholism,
90 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 901, 904 (1979) (showing no statistically significant differ-
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commitment scheme is self-enforced, it may suffer from the same
drawbacks as one that is enforced externally.
A person's recognition of her susceptibility to both temptations
and norms creates a strong motive for her to resist external influ-
ences, which in turn creates a problem for any efforts at social control.
But even if the law could effectively encourage people to make their
own personal rules stronger, it is not clear that more rational behavior
would result, because of the four side effects we have described. Both
the law and personal rules are rigid tools. Wielded with a heavy hand,
they will interfere with the delicate art of rationality.
Where a person's behaviors are intolerable to others, the law must
decide whether to preserve her will or ride roughshod over it. In the
case where the person's behavior endangers others materially, the de-
cision is usually forced; but where she is damaging herself and hurting
others only through their empathic engagement with her, as in the
case of drug abuse, intervention is of less clear value. Insofar as
authorities want to protect her from herself, they need to consider the
internal bargaining situation in which they will be intruding, includ-
ing the possibility that ostensibly short-sighted behaviors are serving a
strategic purpose for her longest-range interest.
C. Ttere Is No Natural Test for Criminal Responsibility
Another controversial question in legal theory is when to hold a
person criminally responsible when identifiable causes of her behavior
are beyond her control. The law follows the popular intuition that it
is fair to blame the person only when she could have done otherwise."
However, as science becomes increasingly proficient at detecting
physiological and even genetic mechanisms for behavior, more and
more misbehavior may seem to meet that test. Monterosso explored
the basis of everyday notions of "could have done otherwise" and
found that people gave physiological explanations the most weight by
ence between groups receiving dislfiram and a control group with respect to total ab-
stinence, days worked, or family stability); see also C. Brewer, Controlled Trials of Antabuse
in Alcoholism: The Importance of Supervision and Adequate Dosage, 86 ACTA PSYCH IATRICA
SCANDINAVICA SUPPLEMENTUM 51, 51-55 (1992) (demonstrating the importance of
close supervision to the successful use of Antabuse).
99 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 54 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1923) (1881) (noting that "it is felt to be impolitic and unjust to make a man an-
swerable for harm, unless he might have chosen otherwise").
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far.' O The experiment described antecedent behaviors using vignettes
that depicted individuals who engaged in undesirable behaviors of
both a personal nature (e.g., overeating) and an interpersonal nature
(e.g., violent temper episodes). The behavior was rated as signifi-
cantly less voluntary and more excusable when its antecedent was
specified as physiological (e.g., low levels of a particular neurotrans-
mitter) as opposed to experiential (e.g., severe parental abuse).
Physiological antecedents led to more judgments that the behavior
was involuntary and thus less worthy of blame, as well as to the en-
dorsement of more favorable treatment (lesser prison sentence or
more healthcare coverage) for the individual described.10]
Classifying behaviors as involuntary based on the presence of a
physiological antecedent could eventually bring to full fruition the old
maxim that "to understand all is to forgive all," and thereby under-
mine criminal deterrence generally. Subjects in the above study were
willing to declare those behaviors that had physiological antecedents
to be involuntary and inappropriate targets for punishment, despite
having explicit information that the misbehaving individuals could
weigh the consequences. The understanding of freedom of will pro-
posed in Section I1I.E nevertheless permits a concept of criminal re-
sponsibility that is consistent with absolute determinism by assessing
whether there was a fighting chance for available incentives, including
the power of the law itself, to deter the behavior. Specifically, a per-
son would be held responsible insofar as the prospect of being held
responsible could realistically have played a role in her choices.
0 2
The existence of a "disease," even a disease of motivation that, say,
made alcohol abnormally alluring, would not in itself rebut responsi-
bility. The attraction of alcohol may be part of a disease, just as an in-
John Monterosso, Explaining Away Behavior: Scientific Analysis and the Trans-
formation of Acts into Occurrences (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Pennsylvania) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Library).
101 For a similar effect in the domain of learning disabilities, see John Sabini &
John Monterosso, Moralization of College Grading: Perfornance, Effart, and Moral Worth, 25
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2003).
102 The common understanding of responsibility does seem to be a fairly constant
perception despite wildly differing jury instructions, if experience with the insanity de-
fense is good evidence. See Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984:
Much Ado About Nothing, 7 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 403, 411 (1989) (showing that there was no
significant difference in jury verdicts resulting from differing jury instructions on the
insanity defense in a controlled experiment); Margaret A. McGreevy et al., The Negligi-
ble Effects of Cali/ornias 1982 Reform of the hsanity Defense Test, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
744, 748-49 (1991) (finding that California's revision of the test for insanity had no
practical impact on the rate of acquittal).
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tense itch is sometimes part of a disease. The decision to gratify the
urge is still subject to free will as we have defined it. Nevertheless,
there are urges that few people can resist, however strong their self-
control. Evidence exists that many seemingly reflexive behaviors are
actually mediated by motivation and thus are ultimately choices.
These behaviors include even the panic response to phobic stimuli
and the emotion-like ("protopathic") component of pain that makes it
aversive.1 3 The fact that people can be taught not to respond to urges
for these behaviors-for instance, in certain therapies for the pain of• 104
dental drilling or childbirth -- demonstrates that pain and panic are
not reflexive but choices. However, resistance is so hard to learn that
the law has to excuse its failure. ° 5 Likewise, a drug addict may have so
damaged the credibility of her will that there was no realistic chance
of her turning down a fix-and again the law might reasonably excuse
her.
The presence or absence of disease has been a handy line to di-
vide those behaviors that respond adequately to incentives from those
that do not. Increasingly sensitive physiological measurement is ob-
scuring this line. There is a continuum of prospects for resisting
temptation ranging from the urge to panic to the casual wish for an-
other dessert. Nature does not draw a line across this continuum at
some point to serve the law's need for a dichotomy. However, the de-
cision to excuse someone could be simply a recognition of her genu-
inely profound defeat, as bankruptcy is for a debtor-serving a practi-
cal purpose, so as not to waste resources for deterrence, as well as to
feel fair. Such a recognition might be accompanied by legal disabili-
ties that would protect others from the bad consequences of her de-
fective will, just as if she were recognized to have a disease. This ap-
proach has the further advantage that it spares medical science the
exercise of discerning the presence of supposed diseases of will in le-
gal cases.
103 See R. Melzack & KL. Casey, The Affective Dimension of Pain, in FEELINGS AND
EMOTIONS 55, 57-62 (Magda B. Arnold ed., 1970) (examining the motivational aspects
of pain and sensory experience). ,
104 For panic, see George A. Clum, Psychological Interventions vs. Drugs in the Treat-
ment of Panic, 20 BEHAV. THERAPY 429 (1989); for pain, see J.C.R. Licklider, On Psycho-
physiological Models, in SENSORY COMMUNICATION 49, 50-51 (Walter A. Rosenblith ed.,
1959); R. Melzack et al., Stratagems for Controlling Pain: Contributions of Auditory Stimula-
tion and Suggestion, 8 EXPERIMENTAL NEUROLOGY 239, 24546 (1963) (suggesting that
structured attention can ameliorate pain perceptions based on experiments with audi-
tory stimulation and other competing sensory stimuli).
105 This holds true even in the case where succumbing to the urge harms others, as
when panic causes an accident.
20031
862 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 151:825
The likelihood that a person is a population of partially conflict-
ing interests makes it easier to understand irrationality. However, it
confirms what our culture has really known all along: that irrational-
ity is notjust a collection of errors but a robustly motivated phenome-
non, and that correcting irrationality is a tenuous art at best. Con-
trolled research on the resulting interactions has only begun and
ultimately will be limited by their recursive nature, but the in the fu-
ture any behavioral model will need to take them into account.
